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Resumen
El seguimiento de políticas industriales (P.I.) para dirigir los recursos hacia sectores considerados
preponderantes para el crecimiento ha sido el camino de muchos países emergentes para enfrentar el
tema del subdesarrollo. Medidas como créditos subsidiados, impuestos variables y barreras arancelarias
diferenciadas son utilizadas frecuentemente para lograrlo. Dado el éxito alcanzado por algunos
expositores de P.I. del sudeste asiático, es tentador para otros países emergentes intentar replicar la
receta. Sin embargo, estos debieran cuestionarse acerca de la competencia de sus gobiernos para
lograrlo. Existen además dos incógnitas respecto del rol de las P.I. en el crecimiento de estos países.
Primero, ¿fueron las P.I. el factor determinante del acelerado crecimiento?. El enfoque neoclásico ofrece
una explicación alternativa, apuntando a la implementación de políticas macroeconómicas sólidas como
explicación principal del milagro asiático. Segundo, ¿se explican los problemas de algunas economías
asiáticas en los noventas por el seguimiento prolongado de P.I? Este artículo encuentra que la evidencia
explica el crecimiento económico por los sólidos fundamentos macroeconómicos, tales como disciplina
fiscal, inflación controlada y niveles adecuados de  tipo de cambio real, variables que impulsaron altos
niveles de ahorro e inversión. Por otro lado, las  implementación de P.I. se dificulta en un mundo
globalizado, donde las regulaciones del comercio mundial han adquirido mayor importancia.
Abstract
The application of industrial policies (IP) to direct resources to industries considered preponderant in
achieving growth has been the chosen road by many emerging economies to tackle underdevelopment.
Subsidized loans, variable taxes and differentiated tariffs are frequently used. Because of the successful
experiences of some South Asian industrial policies, other emerging countries feel tempted of replicating
the formula. However, these should be sure first that their governments have the necessary
competencies. There are also two questions to ask on the role of IPs in the growth of these countries:
first, Were IPs the dominant factor in the countries’ accelerated growth? The neoclassical approach
offers an alternative explanation, that the Asian miracle was mainly the result of strong macroeconomic
policies implemented. The second question is: Can the problems of some Asian economies in the 1990s
be explained by the prolonged application of IPs? This article finds evidence to support that economic
growth was due to strong macroeconomic foundations, such as fiscal discipline, controlled inflation and
adequate real exchange rate levels. These variables were the driving forces that created high levels of
saving and investment. On the other hand, the implementation of IPs is difficult in a globalized world
where the regulations of international trade have become very important.
___________________
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For a period of roughly 35 years the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan pursued industrial
policies (IP) defined as an effort to alter the sectoral structure of production towards sectors they
believed offered greater prospects for accelerated growth than a typical process of industrial
evolution would generate. Used without more specificity, all developing countries, excluding
perhaps Hong Kong, have employed and continue to utilize industrial policy. Credit directed at
specific sectors at below market interest rates for long term and working capital, sectorally
differentiated profits taxes, subsidized electricity rates, research and development subsidies, control
of the entry and exit of firms, and highly differentiated tariffs and non-tariff barriers are all a form
of industrial policy. Several Asian countries, particularly Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (JKT) are the
exemplars of these efforts. Given their success over this period it is tempting to conclude that the
industrial policy played a decisive role in their success.
In analyzing the impact of industrial policy, it is important to distinguish between the
initiation of industrialization and its continuance once a higher level of growth had been achieved.
The recovery in Japan between 1945 and 1955 or 1960 was probably accelerated by the efforts of
the government to restore prewar levels of capacity and productivity in sectors such as mining, cotton
spinning, and steel. In some ways this was the easier part of post-war Japanese growth, as the
knowledge base upon which the prewar structure was based had not been destroyed. Capital
accumulation, the direction of foreign exchange to acquire critical equipment and technology
licenses, and investment coordination almost surely served a positive role though it is hard to prove2
given lacunae in data for this period. Yet when one considers the Japanese or foreign image of Japan
Inc. popular in the 1980s, the issue is not the contribution of industrial policy to the immediate
postwar recovery but the role of government in fostering the entry of firms into new (for Japan)
sectors and whether such policies were the source of rapid growth in living standards in the period
from 1960 to 1990.
Similarly in Korea and Taiwan, government probably played a significant role in the
initiation of industrial development from roughly 1960 to 1970. This was by no means a trivial
achievement and there have been many efforts to understand the government’s role in this process.
However, by the early 1970s both Korea and Taiwan had achieved considerable growth in per capita
income largely based on labor intensive industries and, as in the case of Japan, there was an effort
to move into more capital and technology intensive sectors.
A country considering the imitation of the policies leading to the  initiation of
industrialization in all three countries and trying to derive lessons from the three countries should
worry about the replicability of their experience. A large number of conditions have to be present
including significant government competence and an overriding interest by the government in
economic success measured in growth in income per capita rather than enriching specific groups at
the expense of the society. The interest for many developing countries looking to the countries of
Asia is not the ability of the latter to export wigs, baseball gloves, or shirts, important products in
the initial growth of manufacturing, but their later transition into more complex sectors. Much of the
evidence of this paper considers the success of the three Asian countries in their endeavor to succeed
in more complex industries in the period after higher growth was initiated.3
Two questions immediately arise. First, during the period of successful growth, say 1960-90
for Japan and 1965 through the late 1990s for Korea and Taiwan, was industrial policy “the” source
of growth or was it a mild accelerant, improving the growth rate slightly given the high growth of
capital, education, and gains in total factor productivity (TFP) realized from borrowing technology
from abroad. Second, are any of the problems encountered in Japan since 1990 and in Korea since
1997 partly the legacy of one aspect or another of industrial policy?
An alternative view of the role of industrial policy in explaining these Asian success stories
has been that they resulted largely from getting macroeconomic policies correct: responsible
government monetary and fiscal policy, low inflation, maintaining the correct real exchange rate
were key to their success as was the considerable investment in the education system. Growth was
propelled largely by physical and human capital accumulation and the growth rate of TFP while not
spectacular was high by LDC standards.
The disagreement between those who believe in the efficacy of industrial policy and those
who maintain economic fundamentals were critical is, at one level, unbridgeable, as it would require
an agreement on the counterfactual evolution of sectors and productivity in each. Nevertheless, the
considerable body of evidence available that attempts to empirically assess the impact of industrial
policy brackets most of the plausible counterfactual scenarios. The neoclassical interpretation that
argues that success was due to getting the fundamentals right may be correct but it must deal with
the abundant evidence that JKT were indeed interventionist (World Bank, 1993, Pack and Westphal,
1986, Wade, 1990, Komiya et. al., 1988). The issue is whether the documented use of IP can be
shown to have been a quantitatively significant contributor to welfare. If growth rates, conditional4
on physical and human capital accumulation and normal TFP growth rates would have been 9.7 and
were increased to 10 percent as a result of industrial policy, IP may have played a positive but not
overwhelming role. Did such an increase occur and at what contemporary cost including lost
consumer surplus as well as future costs, including the weakening of the financial system that had
a negative effect in the late 1990s in Korea and throughout the 1990s in Japan?
Some would argue that the above view is too partial and that going one step back, factor
accumulation rates were themselves positively affected by industrial policy. The 35% national saving
rates and the passion for education reflected profit and wage opportunities that were generated by
industrial policy or the lower risk attached to a given prospective rate of return. We will briefly
discuss this later in the paper.
2. THE CASE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
For selective government intervention or industrial policy to be welfare improving,
policymakers must identify market failures that would provide the scope for welfare-enhancing
interventions; design and implement the appropriate interventions; and correct or terminate the
applied policy as changing circumstances warrant.
1  Economists have identified numerous
circumstances in which market failures could provide scope for welfare-enhancing IP.  These
include:
1.  real external economies such as the diffusion of knowledge that one set of firms obtains
without incurring its own costs. One mechanism by which this occurs is the movement of
                                                          
1 We use the term welfare-enhancing and growth-accelerating interchangeably in this discussion. Most of the
theoretical models are explicitly static, hence the normative results are expressed in terms of welfare-
enhancement, not growth-acceleration.  While it is possible that IP could generate a one step increase in
welfare that would not lead to an acceleration in the secular growth rate, we believe that focusing solely on5
individuals among firms but the knowledge spillovers may occur without such movement
from informal exchanges in both professional and social contexts. In the case of traded
goods, real externalities improve welfare only if they allow goods to be produced at less than
the imported c.i.f. price.
2
2.  external economies that arise as the size of a competitive industry increases, permitting a
falling long run supply curve. Such gains in productivity in a competitive sector in which
individual firms exhibits constant or increasing costs are attributable to economies of scope
in the use of specialized equipment and greater specialization of individual skills.
Accelerating the growth of the sector may generate an earlier move toward lower long run
costs as learning-by-doing occurs. Where large-scale economies exist, firms will incur lower
unit cost if capacity is established at higher levels of output. If they perceive only a domestic
market, they will construct a larger plant only if potential purchasers also establish large
plants that generate extensive demand. The market failure is that at a given point in time,
current prices may not convey the information about prospective expansion that is relevant
to attaining a lower cost of production through larger plant size. (Scitovsky, 1953, Chenery,
1959). This generates an argument for coordination of planned investment given by Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) who formalize Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) idea of the “big
push.”  There are multiple equilibria due to pecuniary externalities generated by imperfect
competition with large fixed costs.  They argue that industrial policy which “encourages
industrialization in many sectors simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare
even when investment in any one sector appears impossible” (p. 1024). Such arguments
critically depend on the non-tradability of some of the inputs or difficulties in exporting the
resulting output. (Pack and Westphal, 1986). Growth of the size of the economy will
eventually preclude the need for policies to obtain the productivity gains from either
economies of scope or scale.
3.  externalities conferred on other firms in an industry by the first entrant. These include the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
explicitly dynamic models would be too limiting in this context.
2This is not, however, sufficient to justify intervention. A socially successful intervention depends on whether
the present discounted value (PDV) of future producer surplus exceeds the PDV of the social cost of subsidies.6
demonstration that the sector is physically and economically feasible (Pack and Westphal,
1986, Rob, 1991) and the diffusion of information on technology and marketing conditions.
3
4.  the incomplete appropriability of the results of R & D and the possibility that its private
riskiness exceeds social riskiness.
5.  externalities that arise from the interaction of suppliers and buyers on the design or method
of production of a product leading to a better or cheaper good than is available
internationally. In this case, the source of the externality is the nontradability of some types
of inputs or knowledge - otherwise the improved method or product could be obtained from
international suppliers.
In these cases, IP can be directly welfare-enhancing by improving the competitiveness of
domestic industry, leading to both higher national (and world) output.  There are additional cases in
which IP can be welfare enhancing or growth-promoting through the capture of rents or terms of
trade effects associated with international trade.
4  In these cases, national industrial policies have a
zero-sum element at the global level and could hence be thought of as containing a strategic or
predatory element.  Similarly, the trade endogenous growth literature which links the cross-national
pattern of international trade specialization to differential cross-national growth rates provides
numerous theoretical possibilities for growth-enhancing IP at the national level  (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991).
5
                                                          
3 Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) provides a formal example of this in the form of a model of the interdependence of two
industries.  One industry, which produces an intermediate product, is assumed to be oligopolistic due to underlying scale
economies and engages in Cournot competition.  The other industry, which produces a final product, from an
intermediate product, is perfectly competitive.  In this situation there may be multiple equilibria with one equilibrium
Pareto-superior to the others.  Industrial policy has a positive role in the form of pre-play communication to generate a
superior coordinated equilibrium. For the intervention to convey some purely national welfare-enhancement, there has
to be some non-traded aspect of the externality.  Otherwise, foreigners have access to the same low cost inputs, and the
pattern of production in the downstream industry is indeterminate without additional assumptions.
4 Early formalizations of arguments along these lines are contained in Spencer and Brander (1983) and Itoh
and Kiyono (1987).  Helpman and Krugman (1989) contains a synthesis of the subsequent literature on
strategic trade policy.  Kang (2000a, 2000b) shows that the degree of intellectual property rights protection
can have a strategic effect similar to export subsidization in the earlier literature.
5 It might seem at first blush surprising that the normative results of these models to a large extent turn on conventional7
This discussion has established the theoretical possibility for welfare or growth-enhancing
industrial policies.  It would be beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively map the advisable
policy interventions to the specific market failures or strategic opportunities identified in the
literature.  Nevertheless, it is probably worthwhile pointing out a few general caveats for the
successful implementation of IP.  First, the appropriate policy response may be very case specific.
 For example, in the well-known Brander-Spencer model, the optimal intervention changes from an
export subsidy to an export tax, if Bertrand rather than Cournot competition is assumed.
6  In the case
of the international trade models, multiple policy tools may be necessary to pursue domestic and
international goals if the good in question is not pure importable or exportable.
Second, with the exception of some policies that might be accomplished through pure
informational or coordination effects, industrial policies require scarce resources.  It is not sufficient,
for example, to show that in a partial equilibrium sense that a particular production or export subsidy
might be potentially growth-enhancing if the necessary resources are mobilized at the expense of
even more worthy sectors (Dixit and Grossman, 1986).  This, of course, suggests a more general
informational problem, namely, even if policymakers identify the possibility of a growth accelerating
intervention and the appropriate policy package, they still have to calibrate the appropriate magnitude
of, say, a tax or subsidy: after all, it is as possible to intervene too much as too little.
Third, in the case of globally zero-sum strategic policies, policymakers must consider the
possibility of retaliation.  As a general proposition, one would expect that the possibility of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
differences in factor usage across industries.  As a consequence, they do not appear to yield robust policy inferences.
 Empirical work has focused on modeling international spillovers arising from research and development activities (e.g.
Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997)) rather than on the implications of IP policies.
6 Similarly, the presence of increasing returns to scale, decreases the likelihood that the optimal policy is a
subsidy, since a subsidy may encourage the entry of additional firms into the market and reduce efficiency by8
retaliation would reduce the likelihood of growth-accelerating IP.
7  A basic lesson from the strategic
trade literature is that the possibility of retaliation further complicates the problem of identifying
optimal policies.
8
Finally, in the cases discussed thus far, intervention may be effective if the government itself
does not suffer from deficiencies leading to government failure.  One of the notable lacunae of the
IP literature is the general absence of discussion of political economy factors, in particular the
possibility of rent-seeking behavior by self-interested firms and policymakers and the concomitant
degradation of policy. One of the important aspects of Asian industrial policies was the relative lack
of corruption, perhaps reflecting the high status of civil service jobs and their relatively high rate of
remuneration.9
  This will be touched upon in the discussion of the specific cases below.
3. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN JAPAN
3A. The Policies
The roots of contemporary industrial policies in Japan go back all the way into the Meiji
Restoration of the mid-19
th century, and the state-led development under the slogans Shokusan-
Kogyo (industrialization) and Fukoku-Kyohei (a wealthy nation and a strong army.)  Ironically, the
unequal treaties concluded between Japan and Western powers which greatly circumscribed Japan’s
                                                                                                                                                                                          
reducing plant size or output.  See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for more such examples.
7 However, as demonstrated by Johnson (1953-54), the possibility of retaliation does not eliminate the
possibility that the introduction of a tariff by a large country would necessarily be welfare-reducing even
allowing for retaliation.
8For example, in the Brander-Spencer model with retaliation, the previously optimal export subsidy policy is
welfare-reducing, and the optimal policy is a coordinated export tax by both national governments.
9 See World Bank, 1993, Chapter 4  and Campos and Root (1996)9
ability to protect its domestic industries through tariffs, encouraged Japanese policymakers to
develop other tools such as targeted subsidized lending through state-controlled banks to achieve the
same effect.  Intellectually, the Japanese took their cues from Prussia (a curious precursor of the Axis
alliance of World War II), not Britain, and it was Friedrich List, the proponent of infant industry
promotion, not Alfred Marshall, the father of neoclassical economics, who developed a following
in Japan.
10
Japan developed a dual economy exporting labor-intensive products such as tea, textiles, and
apparel while at the same time developing considerable heavy industry, much of it organized by
family-dominated conglomerates (zaibatsu) and oriented toward military production.  Japan defeated
first China (1895) (annexing Taiwan), then Russia (1905) (eventually annexing Korea) and
established itself as a formidable military power as recognized by Great Britain in the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902.  
State-dominance of the economy, which had waned in the early part of the 20
th century as the
private sector expanded, revived with the political radicalization of the late 1920s, the Great
Depression, and the onset of World War II in the Pacific.  Many of the institutional features often
thought of as uniquely Japanese have their origins in the wartime economy (Okazaki, 1993; Noguchi,
1995). The devastation of World War II left Japan’s per capita income in 1950 at less than three-
fourths its prewar level.  However, the contemporaneous level of per capita income was surely a
misleading indicator of Japan’s underlying technological capacity – Japan, after all, had produced
                                                          
10 Neoclassical economics remained weak in Japan, and until quite recently the bulk of Japanese academic
economists were Marxist in orientation.  This is relevant to the extent that there was a general coincidence
between the neomercantilist orientation of many of the so-called modern economists, and the Japanese
Marxists, who regarded IP as the manifestation of state monopoly capitalism, arguably a progressive
development from their perspective.10
  aircraft carriers and fighter airplanes in the 1930s and, as shown in Table 1, the human capital
embodied in Japan’s labor force was quite high relative to per capita income.
In the aftermath of the war, the Japanese government together with American occupation
authorities implemented an economic reconstruction plan characterized by a considerable amount
of direct state resource allocation, multiple exchange rates, extensive quantitative controls on
imports, foreign exchange, inward foreign investment, and royalties for technology licensing. 
11
After the withdrawal of US occupation forces in 1950, Japan continued to implement sectoral
IP through tax policy, off-budget finance, direct subsidy, subsidized credit, research and development
policy, and controls on international trade, investment, and technology importation, and tolerance
of cartels and other kinds of anti-competitive behavior on the part of domestic firms.  Capital
channeling required repression of the financial system and discouragement of direct finance.  In
addition to these formal policy tools, government officials also sought to exercise influence through
informal administrative guidance (gyosei shido), coercing recalcitrant firms if necessary. The focus
of these efforts was largely oriented toward rebuilding heavy industries such as steel and
transportation equipment that had been destroyed during the war.
The conventional wisdom among economists is that direct subsidies have played little role
in fostering changes in Japan’s industrial composition.  As shown in Figure 1, the declining sectors
of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and coal mining have typically accounted for 90 percent or more of
direct on-budget subsidies in the period after 1955, and one study by the Japanese government found
that only one sector, food processing, received direct subsidies exceeding 0.1 percent of GDP
                                                          
11For histories of early postwar economic policies, see Shinohara (1982), Morishima (1982), Johnson (1982),
and Calder (1993).  The classic work on Japanese IP is Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura (1984/1988).  Okazaki
(2001) provides a highly informative description of the institutions through which post-war Japanese IP was11
originating in that sector (Saxonhouse, 1983).
Another possibility would be indirect subsidies through the tax system and off-budget
finance.  The primary source of subsidized capital is the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP),
under the control of the Ministry of Finance Trust Bureau.  The FILP is an off-budget program
around half the size of the general account budget and has been a powerful policy tool, allowing
bureaucrats to address priorities not met in the general accounts budget with this second or shadow
budget.
Funds for the FILP come mainly from the postal savings system.  In addition to financing the
activities of public corporations, private sector investments are financed through public financial
institutions such as the Japan Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and the Housing Loan
Corporation.  In the early postwar period nearly one-quarter of FILP finance went into strengthening
industry, but the share dropped steadily through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and by 1980 less than
3 percent of FILP funds went to industry, while housing, regional development, and other activities
received half of the money (Ogura and Yoshino, 1988, Table 3).
One source of indirect subsidies is the public financial institutions that offer loans at rates
below the prevailing market interest rate.  A second source of implicit capital subsidy is the
accelerated depreciation allowed under the tax system.
12  Although some countries allow
instantaneous depreciation of new investment, the only method that does not distort profitability of
new investment, most require depreciation to be taken over the life of the asset. Insofar as legal asset
life and the structure of assets differ among sectors, there may be implicit differentiation among them
                                                                                                                                                                                          
carried out. See also Johnson (1984) and Patrick (1986).
12 This discussion follows that of Ogura and Yoshino (1988). Special deprecation schemes have existed in
Japan throughout the postwar period.  The most important of these had the effect of subsidizing certain classes12
in the present discounted value of depreciation allowances. In addition, an export-based special
depreciation system existed from 1961-1972.
An indication of the quantitative significance of the implicit capital subsidies is given in
Table 2, which reports the ratio of the implicit capital subsidy to investment for 14 industries in
1968, 1976, and 1984.
13 In general, the low interest rate loans have been of greater quantitative
significance than the special depreciation provisions.  With the exception of mining, where
investment has been weak and the involvement of public financial institutions high, the implicit
capital subsidy to investment ratio has been low, generally less than 5 percent.  After mining, the
greatest beneficiary of the reduced interest burdens has been the transportation machinery industry,
which includes shipbuilding, motor vehicles, and aircraft.
14
Certain tax and budget policy provisions beyond the relatively uniform low subsidy ratios
reported in Table 2 have been used to promote high technology sectors.  There are special
depreciation provisions for the purchase of numerically controlled machine tools, computers and
terminals, computer aided design equipment, and industrial robots.  Additional tax incentives exist
for the use of these products by small businesses, though the amounts appear to be relatively small.
 Other special tax provisions exist for the software industry.
15  The Japanese computer and robotics
                                                                                                                                                                                          
of investment goods. 
13 The implicit subsidy provided through the provision of these low interest loans has been calculated as the
difference between interest rates charged by private and public sector financial institutions multiplied by the
amount of government financial institution loans.  In the case of the tax provisions, the special tax depreciation
can be thought of as an interest-free loan, thus the subsidy value of the special depreciation provisions is the
implicit interest burden reduction associated with the loan.
14 Japanese policymakers also have access to off-budget funds for industrial promotion through revenues of
quasipublic organizations such as the Motor Boat Racing Association and the Japan Bicycle Rehabilitation
Association (Prestowitz, 1988).  The amounts of these funds do not appear to be particularly large, however.
 Saxonhouse (1983) cites The Wall Street Journal to the effect that no more than $500,000 a year from these
sources was made available to the Japan Machine Tool Builders Association.
15 The tax benefits are not contingent on the origin of the purchased software or equipment, so the impact of13
industries have been further assisted by the Japan Development Bank and Small Business Finance
Corporation funding, including the establishment of special leasing corporations to encourage the
leasing of Japanese computers and robots, especially by small firms.
16
The government has also promoted high technology sectors through direct subsidies to R&D
activity, special deductions for R&D costs, and reduced interest burdens through the provision of
low interest loans by public financial institutions.  Tax preferences were provided through a variety
of schemes.  In addition, there have been direct subsidies to R&D activity.  The most important
channel in quantitative terms has been the system of research contracts on large-scale industrial
technology R&D established in 1966.  Of particular significance were subsidies to promote the
development of computers in the 1970s, and research contracts on next generation industrial
technology, including new materials, biotechnology, and new electronic devices, in the 1980s.
Lastly, private R&D has been subsidized through the provision of low interest loans by
public financial institutions for “financing development of new technology.”  Private R&D activities
are provided indirect support by a number of government-supported institutions.  These include
national and public research institutes, private nonprofit research organizations, special public
corporations, and the mining and manufacturing technology research associations, such as the Very
Large Scale Integration Research Association.
In quantitative terms, the direct subsidies are the most important component of government
                                                                                                                                                                                          
these provisions has been to expand the Japanese market for these products, not assist Japanese manufacturers
per se.  Likewise, special provisions which allow computer manufacturers to deduct expected losses on the
return of equipment offered to users on a trial basis do not discriminate by origin and thus in principle could
be used by domestic manufacturers, local subsidiaries of foreign manufactures, or importers.
16 Unlike the tax provisions, which are justified on the grounds of promoting the diffusion of new technologies
and do not discriminate between domestic and foreign products, the leasing schemes specifically apply to
Japanese made equipment.  The amounts of money involved appear relatively small, however. 14
R&D support, about twice as large as the tax provisions in most years.  Implicit subsidies through
the provision of low interest loans have been relatively unimportant; Government support for
research organizations is approximately as large as direct subsidies. Assessing the sectoral pattern
of R&D is difficult.  Direct subsidies from the government, public corporations, such as Nippon
Telephone and Telegraph (NTT), and special R&D tax deductions are only reported at the aggregate
level.  Sector-specific indirect support through the research associations is difficult to ascertain,
partly because individual associations frequently encompass more than one sector and partly because
the budgets of these organizations include private, as well as government, funding.
Data on the government subsidy share of total R&D expenditures are reported in Table 3.
 As can be seen in these figures, government support of R&D activities is low, with total government
support, allowing for non-subsidy financing, certainly less than 5 percent of private R&D
expenditures for the economy as a whole, far less than the comparable figure for the United States.
 If one looks at individual sectors, government R&D, as a share of total R&D, is seen to have been
highest in the declining mining industry.  After mining, support has been highest in the energy-
related sector of petroleum and coal products and, as in the case of the capital subsidies, the
transportation equipment industry, which includes aerospace.
With respect to external relations some have emphasized the government’s role as a
“doorman,” “determining under what conditions capital technology and manufactured products enter
and leave Japan” (Borrus et al., 1986, p. 98).  Effective rates of protection (ERPs), computed from
tariff data and the Japanese input-output table, are shown in Table 4.
17  In 1968, ERPs were greater
than 10 percent in all manufacturing sectors except publishing, where the ERP was negative.  The
                                                          
17 The ERPs for the primary product sectors are misleading because they do not take into account quotas in15
highest ERPs, in excess of 40 percent were in food processing, textile products, and transportation
machinery.  The estimates for food processing and textile products are probably upwardly biased
indicators of the true ERPs, however, since in these cases major inputs were subject to quota
protection not included in the ERP calculation.  By 1975, ERPs had fallen for most manufacturing
categories.  The reductions in ERPs were most dramatic in the machinery sector, where the ERPs
for transportation and precision machinery fell by approximately 40 and 20 percentage points,
respectively.  The final column for Table 4 presents estimates of ERPs for 1987 based on tariff cuts
agreed to under the Tokyo Round negotiations.  With the aberrant cases of food processing and
textiles excluded, the ERPs are under 10 percent for most manufacturing categories, indicating a
general fall in rates of protection over a 20-year period.  Again, it should be noted that these
calculations are based on tariff protection only; they do not take non-tariff barriers into account and
the sectors are relatively aggregated.  Nonetheless, barring a dramatic increase in nontraditional
protection, a distinct impression of a gradual liberalization in most manufacturing sectors emerges.
The Japanese government also bargained with foreign technology suppliers acting as a
monopsonist. Goto and Wakasugi (1988) provide the example of royalty payments on the
importation of a particular Austrian steel production technology that were held down to 1 cent per
ton for Japan through an agreement between MITI and the industry, while U.S. firms paid up to 35
cents per ton for the licensing of the same technology (p. 190).  Borrus et al. provide examples from
the microelectronics industry in the 1960s and 1970s of how the Japanese government used its
monopsonistic power to extract very low prices for technology transfers from United States firms.
Nevertheless the saving thus achieved was miniscule compared to either export revenues or GDP.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
agriculture and subsidies in agriculture and mining.16
Government procurement is another channel through which the government of Japan could
seek to tilt the playing field.  Bergsten and Noland (1994), for example, calculated that if in 1990
Japanese public entities exhibited the same purchasing patterns with respect to supercomputers
produced by Japanese and US firms (the only non-Japanese producers) as did purchasers in the EU
market (the only third market) that US producers would have increased their sales by $30 million
annually, supporting nearly $5 million in additional R&D.18 Similar, and quantitatively larger,
results were obtained for public procurement of non-super computers.
In another public procurement case, the 1980s dispute over the FSX fighter agreement could
be interpreted as an attempt by the United States government to use its market power to
counterbalance the Japanese government’s monopsony position vis-à-vis General Dynamics.  What
is common in these cases, steel, numerically controlled machine tools, microelectronics, and possibly
aircraft, is a pattern of selective protection, strict regulation of inward foreign direct investment and
technology transfer, and preferential tax treatment and access to capital until industry has achieved
international competitiveness.  Rosovsky (1985) has called this pattern “the denial of the profits of
innovation.”
3B. Assessment
A number of researchers have attempted to model the impact of Japanese IP on output, trade,
and welfare in a cross-industry framework.
19  Lee (1993) examined the impact of Japanese IP using
a computable general equilibrium model.  Unfortunately, the high degree of aggregation (only three
                                                          
18 The same calculation found that the US government appeared discriminate reciprocally against Japanese
supercomputer producers in its procurement decisions.
19 See Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Flamm (1996) for examples of models of single industries.17
traded goods sectors) and the assumption calibration assumption (IP in the 1950s had no impact)
render his results suspect.
Noland (1993a) attempted to evaluate the impact of these policies on the Japanese economy.
 The results obtained indicate that trade protection as measured by the ERPs in Table 4 was generally
associated with worse than expected performance in net exports, apparently contradicting the notion
that Japanese policymakers had successfully promoted infant industries.
20  Indirect subsidies,
however, were associated with the expansion of output and better than expected trade performance.
In fact, the estimated effects were so large as to give credence to the argument that Japanese
industrial policy had acted as a signaling device to private investors, either because the government
was better able to process information than private agents or because government participation in
a sector or project created a moral hazard or one-way bet.  While the industrial policies were
effective in the sense that market interventions did appear to have an impact on sectoral resource
flows, on the whole they did not appear to be welfare enhancing, when the Itoh-Kiyono model,
which runs off of terms of trade effects, was used to evaluate policy impact.  Indeed, from this
perspective welfare-enhancing interventions appeared to be the exceptions, not the rule.
There is considerable evidence supporting the unsurprising notion that during the postwar
period, Japan’s comparative advantage shifted into R&D-intensive activities (Balassa and Noland
(1989), Vestal (1989), Grossman (1990).)  Evidence on the impact of public policies is more scarce.
 Noland (1996) disaggregated R&D into basic, developmental, and applied activities and separated
public and private sources of funding.  At the end of the sample period 1969-1989, Japan had a
                                                          
20 Noland (1997) obtained more ambiguous results for a more detailed menu of Japanese trade policies.
Audretsch and Yamawaki (1988) investigated the impact of Japanese IP by including a dummy variable for
“favored industries” in a regression on US-Japan bilateral trade.  The coefficient was significant with the18
comparative advantage in goods intensive in total, privately funded, and applied R&D activities, and
a comparative disadvantage in publicly funded and basic R&D intensive goods.  However, the
change in coefficient values over the course of the sample period suggested that publicly financed
R&D had a large positive impact on sectoral trade competitiveness through the late-1970s/early-
1980s.  This result could be interpreted as being consistent with the notion that the relative impact
of public support could be relatively high at early stages of development before the private sector
R&D capacity was significantly developed and during the period of technological catch-up when
R&D priorities could be relatively well defined on the basis of existing technologies.21  However,
Sakakibara (1997) casts doubt on even this modest formulation, arguing that participation in publicly
supported R&D consortia was concentrated in slow growth sectors and that sharing fixed costs was
not an important factor in determining participation.
Beason and Weinstein (1996) directly confront the issue of IP and sectoral TFP growth. 
Working with a 13 sector sample for the period 1955-1990, they fail to uncover evidence that IP as
measured by the ERPs reported in Table 4, taxes, or subsidies, targeted sectors with increasing
returns to scale or that IP contributed to TFP growth.  They do find some evidence that prior to the
first oil shock, IP targeted sectors with high labor usage. Lawrence and Weinstein (2001) extend this
work on a slightly different data set and find that differential corporate tax rates had an impact on
sectoral TFP growth, while direct subsidies and subsidized loans did not.  Moreover, they find that
the ERP measure is negatively associated with sectoral TFP growth and that imports, not exports,
and are positively associated with TFP growth.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
expected sign.
21 Kim and Oh (1999) analyze annual data on research and development expenditures for 1971-1997 and find that public
RD expenditures Granger-cause private RD in Japan during this period.  Unfortunately, their limited sample size19
There are at least two channels through which imports could contribute to increasing
productivity.  The first is by affording domestic producers to new, improved, or highly specialized
intermediate inputs to which they would not otherwise have access.  The second is by competing
with domestic products, the availability of imports acts as a constant spur to domestic producers to
cut costs and improve quality.  Lawrence and Weinstein divide imports into “competitive” and
“noncompetitive” imports and the case of Japan, find evidence to support the second hypothesis.
 From this they conclude that Japan’s growth would have been even faster if it had cut tariffs and
exposed a greater share of its domestic producers to foreign competition.
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the informal policies, if for no other reason than
that they are less amenable to formal modeling.  For this reason, it would be desirable to develop
better descriptions of the workings of the industry councils (shingikai) and the process of setting
targets.  It would be equally desirable to develop better accounts of the penalties and rewards used
to encourage adherence to informal guidance.  The one study that attempted to model the impact of
administrative guidance, Weinstein (1995), found that administrative encouragement of cartels had
only a minor impact on prices, margins, and sectoral resource allocation during the period 1957-
1988.  Sakakibara and Porter (2001), who examine the impact of tolerance of cartels on domestic
competition and international trade performance, interpret their results (cartels are negatively
associated with domestic competition which, in turn, is positively associated with international
competitiveness) as undercutting what they perceive as the conventional wisdom that IP has
promoted Japanese competitiveness.
Lastly, it should be noted that this discussion has focused on issues relating to cross-sectoral
                                                                                                                                                                                          
precludes the testing of this result for sub-periods.20
resource allocation.  Some argue that Japanese policy has had a “pro-producer” bias and that this
may have contributed to Japan’s growth performance by increasing incentives to save, providing
Japanese firms with a ready supply of low cost capital.
22  As shown in Figure 2, Japan (as well as
Korea and Taiwan) did in fact accumulate capital more rapidly than the major Latin American
economies.  This argument is seldom if ever formalized however, and while it has some surface
plausibility, it is hard to square with the life cycle hypothesis, and research on Japanese saving
behavior has not uncovered links between IP and national saving.
23  However, an interesting paper
by Yano (2001), demonstrates that in a dynamic two-country model, that lax competition policies
with respect to the non-traded sector of a large trade-surplus economy can act as a “beggar-thy-
neighbor” policy, shifting real income to itself from its trade-deficit partner.
3C. Politics and Implementation
IP intrinsically supports some sectors to the detriment of others.  It would seem plausible that
this would be manifested in conflict among sectors and among their bureaucratic counterparts.
Within ministries, the bureaucratic hierarchy can ensure plan consistency, with conflicts resolved
through conventional means.  Ensuring consistency between plans of different ministries in Japan
has been far more problematic.
Indeed, conflicts between competing ministries are a recurrent feature of Japanese politics.
 One example would be the perennial clashes between the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) (or its successor the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)) representing
                                                          
22 A largely closed capital account up through the mid-1980s facilitated the maintenance of a pool of captive
saving, though this is not absolutely necessary if there is home-bias in portfolio allocations.
23 See Balassa and Noland (1988) chapter 4, and Horioka and Watanabe (1997) on this point.21
the interests of the electronics firms and Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) (or its
successor, the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and Telecommunications)
representing the interests of NTT.
24  Inevitably what is at issue is the desire of the electronics firms
to see telecommunications reform to encourage the growth of electronic data transmission and other
activities that could be expected to increase demand for electronic equipment such as computers.
 The result of these disputes can be protracted periods of uncertainty and policy paralysis until the
inter-ministerial conflict is resolved.  One could interpret the results reported above that policy
interventions were not welfare enhancing, as evidence of a lack of overall policy coherence.
The degree of ministerial coordination in formulating industrial policy points to the issue of
rewards and punishments to encourage compliance.  An important question is whether the
government can coordinate its incentives across ministries. Could, for example, bureaucrats threaten
recalcitrant firms with retribution through actions, say, tax harassment or exclusion from government
procurement, which are the purview of another ministry?  Put differently, is the game firm vs.
ministry, or firm vs. government?  There is little evidence of cross-ministry coordination, and
although most of the political science literature extolling the impact of industrial policy implicitly
assumes benevolent bureaucrats, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1997) argue that Japanese IP can best
be understood as a product of self-interested political actors.
3D. Conclusions
There is considerable evidence that IP has influenced the sectoral composition of output and
                                                          
24 In the past year Japan has undertaken a number of telecommunications reforms.  Nevertheless, the principal
theme of METI’s 2001 White Paper – which was released after the telecom reforms were enacted – was the
need for further reform of the telecom sector – the purview of another ministry.22
trade in Japan.  However, rather than being the forward-looking drivers that IP-proponents envision,
at least in terms of measurable interventions, the evidence suggests that IP was aimed  
overwhelmingly at internationally non-competitive natural resource-based sectors.  Indeed, once
general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, in all likelihood the manufacturing sector
as a whole experienced negative net resource transfers.  This supposition appears to be borne out by
Table 5, which reports sectoral tax rates normalized for the overall corporate tax level.  The
normalized tax rates for the manufacturing sector are almost uniformly negative – i.e. the sector was
paying higher than average taxes.  Within the manufacturing IP might then be regarded as a
compensatory policy toward some favored activities or firms.23
Thus the empirical estimates of many types reviewed here indicate there is no firm evidence
that IP was welfare or growth-enhancing in the period after the postwar reconstruction period.  This
could be due to the inability of policymakers to identify market failures and design appropriate
interventions.  However the evidence that most resource flows went to large, politically influential
“backwards” sectors, suggest that political economy considerations may be central to this outcome.
4. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN KOREA
The Korean IP experience has generated significantly less attention than the Japanese case
– Korea is a smaller economy, Korea has posed less of a competitive threat to US industry and hence
has attracted less attention from US-based scholars, and finally, limitations of Korean data on the
relevant policy instruments have severely constrained the ability of researchers to do the kind of
applied work on Korea that they have on Japan.
Like Japan, Korea went through an extended period of relative isolation from the rest of the
world, which came to an end in the late 19
th century.  As noted earlier, Korea was occupied by Japan
in 1905, and formally annexed in 1910.  Japanese colonial rule ended with Japan’s defeat in 1945,
and the peninsula was divided into US and Soviet zones of military control.  The partition of the
peninsula was formalized in 1948.
Considerable industrialization and technological learning occurred during the Japanese
colonial period, though most of the industry was located in the northern part of the peninsula, with
the southern part of the peninsula serving as the breadbasket.
25  Japanese economic institutions and
practices were transferred to the peninsula.  As in the case of Japan, operation of the economy during24
the period of US military occupation was characterized by a high degree of state control and use of
quantitative allocations.
The Korean War (1950-53), which involved the armies of both sides traversing the peninsula
several times, destroyed much of the capital stock.  Mass population movements (mainly from north
to south) presumably resulted in a net flow of human capital from the North to the South.  As in the
case of Japan’s emergence from the Second World War, the data in Table 1 suggest that in the
aftermath of the Korean War, South Korea’s endowment of human capital was high relative to its
contemporaneous income level.26  Moreover, South Korea continued to accumulate human capital
rapidly after the war (Figure 3).  Its students were relatively concentrated in science and engineering,
though not remarkably so – indeed, the striking thing is how similar the Asian and Latin American
countries looked in this regard (Table 6).
The maintenance of negative real interest rates until the 1960s inhibited the development of
the banking sector, which was permitted little freedom from government control, and encouraged
the channeling of capital to large politically influential borrowers.  As the prominent South Korean
economist Cho Soon observed, "the most notable feature of the [South] Korean economy during the
1950s was its dependence on US economic aid" (Cho, 1994, p.13).
27
                                                                                                                                                                                          
25 See Noland (2000a) for additional details and references to the relevant literature.
26 Rodrik (1995) makes the same point.
27 This assistance was not entirely without merit, however.  South Koreans were able to expand their skill base
through cooperation with the US.  American aid directly contributed to the rapid expansion of education within
South Korea and made overseas training and education possible for thousands of Koreans (Westphal et al.,
1981), including some of its future economic policymakers.  Some transfer of technical skills and management
techniques undoubtedly occurred through close contact with US military forces, but its significance is difficult
to assess. Likewise, local firms certainly benefited from participation in local military procurement programs,
and later from offshore procurement programs during the Vietnam War (Rhee, 1994).25
The orientation of Korean policy changed significantly in the mid-1960s following a military
coup that brought General Park Chung-hee to power.  Export performance was seized as a barometer
of success – as one observer put it, “they were the only statistics that couldn’t be faked.”  Multiple
exchange rates were unified and the currency devalued in 1964.  Export targets were formulated in
considerable detail by product, market, and exporting firm. Firms not achieving them were not
subject to penalty; however, the targets were sometimes negotiated jointly with wastage allowances,
and there is some evidence that firms achieving their targeted goals could expect more favorable tax
treatment (Westphal and Kim, 1982).
At the same time the government began to introduce a wide range of export promotion
measures. A government-subsidized organization, the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation
(KOTRA), was established to promote exports and perform market research.  Exporters were
provided exemptions from duties on imported intermediates, tax incentives, preferential access to
capital, special depreciation allowances on imported capital equipment, and a variety of non-
pecuniary awards. Exporters also received generous wastage allowances on duty-free imports and
reduced prices for electricity and rail transport.
28  The export-import-link system allowed exporters
to earn rents through the importation of restricted items.  Overall, the trade regime could be
characterized as modestly pro-export biased, with established industries receiving roughly neutral
effective incentives, while a few infant industries were actively promoted (Westphal and Kim,
1982).
29
                                                          
28The excess wastage allowances on duty-free imports for export production allowed export oriented firms to
divert these duty-free inputs into the production of goods for local sale to their competitive advantage in the
domestic market.
29While the trade regime was being recast toward greater export-orientation, reforms were also implemented
in other areas of economic policy.  In 1963, the military government revised the labor laws to discourage the26
Economic policy began to change in the 1970s in response to a variety of internal and
external political developments.  Korea initiated the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive in an
attempt to steer the composition of industrial output toward more capital and technology intensive
sectors (to reduce reliance on low real wage levels) engineering-intensive products with the aim of
upgrading its export profile and reducing its reliance on imported arms. IP efforts were intensified,
and in contrast to the relatively rules-based policies of the 1960s, greater policy discretion and
selectivity was introduced. 
The financial liberalization policy was reversed in 1972, when interest rates were lowered
and direct government control of the banking system was increased in order to channel capital to
preferred sectors, projects, or firms.  In order to finance large-scale projects, special public financial
institutions were established, and private commercial banks were instructed to make loans to
strategic projects on a preferential basis.  By the late 1970s, the share of these "policy loans" had
risen to 60 percent (Yoo, 1994).  These loans carried, on average, negative real interest rates, and the
annual interest subsidy grew from about three percent of GNP in 1962-71 to approximately ten
percent of GNP on average between 1972 and 1979 (Pyo, 1989).  Capital channeling policies were
augmented by extensive tax incentives for the priority industries.  It is estimated that the effect of
the special tax measures was to reduce the marginal corporate tax rate from 50 percent to 20 percent
for the targeted industries.  These industries also received trade protection.  This era came to a close
                                                                                                                                                                                          
establishment of independent labor unions, and instead to encourage the organization of unions within a
centralized system, established so as to facilitate government control.  This system was tightened further in
1971 by the introduction of legislation banning strikes, which made virtually any form of collective bargaining
or action illegal (Haggard, 1990; Cho,1994).Financial reform began in 1965, when interest rates were raised
encouraging saving and financial deepening as well as more efficient use of capital.  The national saving rate
doubled in five years, and the ratio of M2 (a broad definition of the money supply) to GNP nearly tripled over
the same period.27
in late 1979 with the assassination of Park in 1979 and the second oil shock.  Subsequent Korean
governments have attempted to scale back IP, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success.  
4A. Assessment
For industrial policies to be successful, the market equilibrium must be sub-optimal. 
Governments must be able to identify these opportunities for welfare-enhancing interventions,
formulate and implement the appropriate policies, and prevent political market failures from leading
the policies astray.  In the case of Korea, IP policies clearly affected the cross-sector allocation of
resources.  As a consequence of the HCI credit, tax, and trade policies, Yoo (1994) estimates that
during the late 1970s around 80 percent of fixed investment in the manufacturing sector went to the
favored heavy and chemical industries.  During the first three years of the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1977-81), investment in basic metals and chemicals was 130 percent and 121 percent, respectively,
of the targets for the entire period, while textiles and other light industries received only 50 percent
and 42 percent, respectively of their planned investment (Balassa, 1990). Whether this resource
channeling was welfare-enhancing or growth promoting is less clear. 
Kim (1990) surveys the fiscal, credit, tax, and trade policies undertaken during this period
and concludes that the policy was unsuccessful: it had the predictable result of generating excess
capacity in favored sectors while starving non-favored sectors for resources, as well as contributing
to inflation and the accumulation of foreign debt.  Moreover, “the government [was] reckless in its
selection of launch enterprises and in its almost haphazard provision of generous incentives… [its]28
direct, unlimited role in industrial promotion placed it in the position of an implicit, de facto risk-
partner, thus complicating the efforts at market-determined adjustment” (p. 44).
Yoo (1990) covers similar terrain, distinguishing between the less selective efforts at export
promotion in the 1960s, and the more aggressive industrial promotion efforts of the 1970s.  Yoo
(1990) also directly confronts the argument that the HCI policy was a success inasmuch as the
industries favored by the HCI policy became major exporters in the 1980s.  He addresses this
argument by posing two counterfactuals: what would the Korean economy have looked like in the
absence of the policy, and how would the Korean trade structure have looked in its absence?
Using reasoning similar to Kim’s, Yoo concludes that in macroeconomic terms the Korea
economy would have been better off without the HCI policy.  But what about industrial upgrading?
 Yoo compares the Korean experience with other, similarly endowed economies (in particular
Taiwan) and concludes that on the basis of upgrading or trade performance the HCI policy was not
a success.  Indeed, given the high rates of return on capital, the opportunity costs of prematurely
promoting a sector may have been enormous. 29
Park and Kwon (1995) conclude that during the HCI drive, the establishment of oligopolistic
positions by the chaebol retarded technological change.  They argue that once scale economies were
taken into account, TFP, correctly measured, actually turned negative, though the disentangling of
scale economies from TFP is not straightforward.30  Similarly, Kwon and Paik (1995) use a
computable general equilibrium model calibrated to 1978 to investigate the potential magnitude of
these directions.  They conclude that resource misallocation reduced GDP by less than one percent
if capital is assumed to be immobile, and more than three percent if it is mobile.  The welfare impact
they calculate is higher.
The one paper that directly takes on the linkage between IP and sectoral productivity growth
is Lee (1997).  It examines a panel of 38 Korean industries over the period 1963-83.  Lee finds that
trade protection in the form of tariff or non-tariff barriers is negatively associated with the growth
rate of labor and total factor productivity.  Tax incentives and subsidized credit were uncorrelated
with sectoral productivity growth.  A paper by Yoo (1993) that analyzed the determinants of the
cross-sectional pattern of trade protection did not obtain robust results, but was suggestive of
political economy rather than efficiency considerations as determining the pattern of protection. 
Finally, Pack (2000) finds that TFP growth in the heavy and chemical industry sectors was not
sufficiently large to have exerted a major impact on aggregate growth.
These results cast doubt on the efficacy of resource channeling.  What about the line of
argument of Pack and Westphal and Okuno-Fujiwara that has focused on inter-industry linkages and
                                                          
30 See Kwack (2000) Tables 7 and 8, which summarize 23 studies of Korean TFP growth.  In Kwack’s own estimation
he finds, like Kwon and Park, that Korean TFP growth declined over time, and in the case of light industry, actually
turned negative.  It is hard to understand how resource misallocation driven by favoritism toward heavy industry could
result in light industry TFP turning negative.  This simply underscores the point that these TFP estimates are unlikely
to be very robust, depending on both theoretical specifications, and delicate estimates of capital stocks during a time of
both rapid capital accumulation and technological obsolescence.30
the potentially welfare-enhancing coordination role for the government?  Pack and Westphal
suggested that Korea’s selective intervention policy might have been successful in fostering infant
industries without significant losses in efficiency in the early stages of development, the mid ‘60s
to the early ‘70s.  The key was to capture latent inter-industry pecuniary and non-pecuniary
externalities.  “The Korean government can be seen as having achieved integrated decision-making
by acting as a central agent mediating among market agents, forcing and facilitating information
interchange and insuring the implementation of decisions reached…weighing costs and benefits from
a collective standpoint and often intervening to reward cooperative players and punish uncooperative
ones” (p.99)
In both this model and that of Okuno-Fujiwara, the same outcome could presumably be
attained through organizational integration.  Pack and Westphal argue that in the case of Korea this
was not feasible: “the externalities may flow in complex and inseparable patterns among (actual and
potential) agents covering most if not all of the industrial sector” (p.99), necessitating government
intervention.
31 Investment coordination may have helped to overcome these patterns in the early
stages of industrialization. However, by the 1970s the growth of the chaebol undoubtedly reduced
the importance of government coordination.  While none of these giant firms produced the entire
range of industrial products, the owners of the firms knew each other and private coordination
became feasible and undoubtedly occurred. While government intervention might have reduced
                                                          
31 Indeed, Auty (1991) provides detailed descriptions of indivisibilities and other entry barriers in the HCI
industries.  Even after assessing possible pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities, however, he concludes
that from an economy-wide perspective, resources were misallocated.31
some interpersonal transaction costs, many of the potential externalities were presumably dealt with
by Coasian agreements among the firms.
32
The key to welfare-enhancing industrial policies through government coordination activities
to capture inter-industry externalities lies the existence of inter-industry externalities, which when
captured, expand the production set of the economy. It is difficult to model this rigorously.  However
it would seem that the likely scope for growth-enhancing interventions would be increased if the
industries targeted for intervention met three criteria.  The first is that they have strong inter-industry
linkages to the rest of the economy.  Second, they should be leading in a causal sense, so that growth
stimulus would be transmitted forward through the economy.   One might think of an input supplier
industry in the Okuno-Fujiwara model, as an example.  Finally, variations in output should have a
strong industry-specific component: otherwise variations in output might simply be due to common
macroeconomic shocks and there is little scope for industry-specific stimulus.  The existence of
industry-specific variation in output suggests the possibility for industry-specific technical change
and/or scope for industry-specific policy interventions to increase output. Noland (1993b) examined
data on 26 Korean manufacturing industries over the period 1960-1989.  He identified four sectors
that possibly met these criteria: wood products, paper, petroleum and coal products, non-ferrous
metals, and a fifth, non-metallic products, which arguably did.  These are not the typical sectors that
one would associate with IP, nor were any of them promoted during the HCI drive.
Another test of potential inter-industry externalities is provided by Pack (2000). Industrial
policies could have generated benefits in other sectors as a consequence of three developments:
                                                          
32 If anything, this argument seems more applicable to the Japanese case: in Japan vertical integration is less
complete: the keiretsu, networks of affiliated firms, strike a balance between the coordination advantage  of
full integration, and the maintenance of competition among suppliers.  In this more loosely organized system32
(1)  domestic production of intermediate goods with special characteristics that were not
available internationally but improved productivity in the local purchasing firm;
(2)  movement by workers and managers from firms in promoted sectors to firms in other
sectors, the movers bringing with them uncodified knowledge;
(3)  direct interactions on equipment design by producers and local buyers of machinery that led
to adaptations to machinery that were particularly suitable for local firms;
All three externalities could potentially increase TFP growth in the neglected sectors in
addition to any benefits accruing to the directly promoted sectors. The potential quantitative
importance of specialized non-traded intermediate inputs and uncodified knowledge transmitted by
workers depends on how much the neglected sectors interact with the promoted ones. One way to
gauge the potential benefits is to measure the purchases of inputs from a favored sector per won of
gross output in the neglected sector. The larger the purchase, the more likely it is that the neglected
sector may derive some benefits from the existence of local producers. The neglected sector may also
derive greater benefits if there are few imports, which constitute an alternative source of specialized
inputs.
We assume that (1) and (2) depend on the magnitude of interaction with the promoted
sectors. Such interactions can be measured by Leontief input-output coefficients. The n x n input-
output coefficient table, A, consists of two sets of flows, the domestic inter-sectoral flows, AD, and
the import flow matrix, AM, A = AD + AM.  aij is a typical coefficient of the domestic flow table while
mij denotes elements of the import matrix. The extent of interaction between favored and neglected
sectors is given by the domestic input-output coefficient afn which measures the purchases of an input
from a favored sector per dollar of gross output of the neglected sector. The larger is afn, the more
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the government’s coordinating role could be larger.33
likely the neglected sector may derive some benefits from the existence of local producers.
33 The
neglected sector may derive greater benefits if there are few imports that constitute an alternative
source of specialized inputs. Thus, the lower is mij relative to aij, the larger the potential impact of
the availability of local production.
Several measures of the magnitude of interaction between the promoted and neglected
sectors in Korea are presented in Table 7. The average input-output interaction between favored and
neglected sectors is quite small. The favored sectors account for a very small portion of the
domestically purchased inputs of most neglected sectors. Second, the heavy industries purchase
extensively from one another. Third, the imports of the neglected sectors in Korea are, on average,
twice the size of the combined purchases from the favored domestic sectors  (.134 vs. .068).
These patterns suggest the following probable effects on non-promoted sectors:
•  It is unlikely that the promoted sectors were quantitatively critical in increasing the
range of available inputs. Although industrial policies may have encouraged the
domestic production of some unique, non-traded inputs, the overall impact was small
relative to all domestic and foreign purchases. Unless there was very low
substitutability between local and foreign inputs, the quantitative effect of local
supply of such inputs was limited. Rosenberg (1976) cites the importance of local
interactions where both user and producer were themselves at the world frontier and
there were no suppliers in other countries. In contrast, Korean firms in the periods
considered were not at the world frontier in the neglected sectors and had many
opportunities for obtaining specialized inputs from abroad and the imports into all
sectors demonstrate this was an opportunity that was utilized.
•  Insofar as movement of workers and managers might provide important knowledge,
the small purchases from the promoted sectors imply  that such knowledge
                                                          
33 It is possible to test whether indirect interactions mediated through other sectors have an effect by using the
inverse coefficients of the Leontief matrix. But the sources of real external economies enumerated above are
not easily extended to indirect interactions.34
transmission would have been limited. Any tacit knowledge brought by worker
mobility, about the special properties of purchased inputs or how to use them more
effectively, would affect only a small component of total costs. While one can posit,
as in the case of specialized inputs, that there is a critical piece of knowledge whose
possession has exceptionally high marginal productivity for the recipient sector, the
quantitative case does not seem plausible. Moreover, such knowledge could have
been obtained from technology licensing agreements and consultants from abroad.
•  Promoted sectors are substantial purchasers of one another’s inputs, at least in the
metal based sectors. Thus, the necessary condition for investment coordination
benefits existed in 1985. However, these sectors were by that year already large
exporters and importers of products within the sector (see column 4). While the
investment coordination story cannot be dismissed, the extensive international trade
suggests it was unlikely to be decisive.
Some interactions are not captured by input-output transactions shown. In particular, the
interactions between the producers and final purchasers of machines are not given as investment is
a final demand. Table 8 shows the ratio of imports to domestic production of machinery. In Korea,
imports of non-electrical machinery were three times that of domestic production. It is difficult to
argue that there were no imported substitutes or that special adaptations to local conditions were
quantitatively significant. Even if locally produced equipment conferred some cost reductions on its
users that would not have been available from internationally available equipment, it would have
affected only one quarter of annual general machinery investment as late as 1985.
4B. Politics and Implementation
There is less evidence about the impact of IP on growth in the case of Korea than in the case
of Japan.  However, if anything, the Korean case underlines the problematic nature of the actual
implementation of IP.  There have been two interrelated problems.  First, the involvement of the state
in both the implementation of IP and the financial sector that financed it gave rise to enormous
problems of moral hazard and the socialization of risk.  The chaebol could use capital from favored
projects to cross-subsidize other ventures, confident that the government would not allow them to35
fail.  The result was investment without regard to rates of return and weak corporate balance sheets.
 Without workable bankruptcy or “exit” policies to discipline failures, management strategy
amounted to unlimited expansion or what Yoo (1999) called “survival of the fattest.” Statistics on
chaebols do not exist for the 1960s (because of lack of balance sheet data), but Sakong (1994)
documents that the share of the top ten chaebol in South Korean GDP rose from five percent to 23
percent in the decade between 1973 and 1982.
 According to the OECD, “shareholder value was systematically destroyed from the late
1980s onwards” (OECD, 1998, p. 23). The events of recent years are a testimony to this weakness
– the $73 billion bankruptcy of Daewoo, the country’s second-largest chaebol, was the largest
corporate failure in world history, and Hyundai, the country’s largest, is facing exceptional stress
under market pressure.
Second, the availability of subsidized resources and the centrality of government relations
to corporate success gave rise to an orgy of rent-seeking and corruption that continues to bedevil
Korean business-government relations.
34  In the 1999 Transparency International “corruptions
perceptions index,” South Korea ranked 50
th out of 99, tied with Jamaica and Lithuania. In the more
narrow “bribe payers index,” a measure of bribe-taking by senior public officials, South Korea
ranked 18
th of 19, surpassed only by China. This lack of transparency imposes a penalty on financial
transactions in the South Korean market, increasing investor hurdle rates, and inhibiting the ability
of good firms to access capital.  The transparency risk premium, separate from and in addition to
conventional country and currency risk, inhibits investment in the South Korean economy.
35
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 For more recent material, see Noland (2000) and Woo-Cumings (2001).
35 See Noland (2001) for more details.36
4C. Conclusions
Korea was a former colony of Japan, and inherited certain Japan institutions and tendencies
in the economics sphere.  Like Japan, it suffered significant devastation through war, and its level
of human capital and social capacity in the 1950s was high relative to contemporaneous income.  IP
policies were pursued even more intensely than in Japan.
Most of the evidence on resource channeling suggests that it did not have a major impact on
growth after the initiation in 1973 of the program to encourage the engineering and chemical sectors.
 If anything, the impact appears to be negative.  However, there is bountiful evidence of the
detrimental impact that IP has had on business-government relations and corporate governance after
the initiation of the HCI effort.  As state intervention into the economy grew in the 1970s, political
connections became increasingly important relative to business acumen in determining success. 
Korea still lacks viable “exit” mechanisms for failing firms, and business-government relations
remain seeped in non-transparency and corruption.
5. INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN TAIWAN
Like Korea, Taiwan is a former Japanese colony, and like Japan and Korea, it also had an
Olsonian upheaval, in this case associated with the conclusion of the Chinese revolution, and the
decampment of the Nationalist government and thousands of its supporters to Taiwan at the end of
1948.
There has been considerable analysis of Taiwan’s experience with industrial policy. The
standard neoclassical interpretation (Little, [1979]) has been that Taiwan’s development was37
primarily attributable to a low level of trade protection, the availability of inputs to exporters at
international prices, a conservative macroeconomic policy manifested in limited inflation, and factor
markets that were competitive. The last points are suggested by positive real rates of interest and the
absence of duality in the wage structure, either by size of firm or by sector. Detailed analysis by
Wade [1990] and others contend that a critical component of Taiwan's success was its industrial
policy that helped to establish new and successful manufacturing sectors.
36  These studies have
documented the extensive employment of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and selective credit
policies and argue that Taiwan's success in the period considered was attributable to an intensive
effort by the government to direct the sectoral evolution of the economy. This was implemented by
a variety of means: (1) the establishment of public enterprises when private initiative was not
forthcoming or the capital markets were reluctant or unable to fund very large projects; (2) extensive
employment of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports; (3) direction of credit to preferred
industrial sectors through the highly controlled financial sector. The view that Taiwan approximated
the laissez faire environment of Hong Kong is untenable in light of the carefully accumulated facts.
Moreover, the data on which earlier interpretations were based on fairly low (but by no means single
digit) effective protection rates that were estimated in the late 1960s. As in the case of Japan and
Korea, Taiwan’s industrial policy may have helped to jump-start the economy from its low 1950
levels and much of the evidence on the role of the government focuses on the 1960s and early 1970s.
However, the benefits from industrial policy in the succeeding years are not easily shown though
undoubtedly there were continuing efforts.
The basic fiscal incentive program was the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment
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(SEI) that was in place from 1961 until 1990.  Available to both foreign and domestic firms, it
targeted specific industries, though the focus shifted over time from exporting (1960s) to capital-
intensive sectors (1970s) to technology intensive sectors (1980s).  Under this program participating
firms could choose tax exemptions or accelerated depreciation on capital equipment, with most firms
taking the former option.
In 1987 the government commissioned a study to examine the program.  It concluded that
while the program might have contributed to economic development at the outset, by the 1980s it
had outlived its usefulness.  Specifically, the report cited four problems:  (1) the program was
contributing to highly uneven tax burdens across firms; (2) the complexity of the law was
creating insurmountable difficulties in administration; (3) the creation of groups with a vested
interest in the continuation of the status quo was inhibiting the adoption of more rational policies;
and (4) the correlation between participating firms and productivity or profitability was low.39
            In response, the government discontinued the SEI in 1990, replacing it with the more
functionally oriented Statute for the Upgrading of Industry (SUI).  Under SUI firms were eligible
for tax relief based on their expenditure on socially favored activities such as R&D or pollution-
control, though some industry-specific incentives in the high-technology sector were retained. 
Interestingly enough, the Taiwan’s president at the time, Lee Teng-hui, was a US-educated PhD.
economist who had co-authored the first study of effective incentives in Taiwan (Lee and Liang,
1982).
A second IP tool was directed credit.  Like Japan and Korea, Taiwan maintained a
relatively repressed financial system and channeled credit, though not to the extent the Koreans
did.  Smith (2000) shows that public utilities were the largest recipient of loans to promote
strategic industries followed by chemicals.  The most important subsidized credit program was
export finance to provide pre-shipment finance and the importation of raw materials.  As shown
in Figure 4, the differential between the interest rate between export loans and non-export loans
was significant in the 1960s and 1970s.  However the volume of these loans were rather small,
and at least since 1971, the first year for which data are available, the subsidy component was
less than one quarter of one percent of the value of exports.  High technology industries were not
major recipients of either strategic or export loans.
  The third major tool of IP was trade controls.  Taiwan pursued ISI policies in the 1950s,
and its trade regime in the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by relatively high nominal tariffs,
especially in agriculture; ubiquitous non-tariff barriers – again, especially in agriculture;
restrictions on inward foreign investment; and the promotion of state-owned firms.  However,40
beginning in the 1960s, policies were adopted to limit the inefficiencies associated with trade
protection.  With respect to domestic sales, producers seeking protection had to justify protection
on the basis of their ability to compete against imports, and were subject to time-phased price
controls that forced them to reduce prices in the local market to within five percent of
comparable to imports by 1973 (Lee and Liang, 1982).
 With respect to foreign sales, the impact of trade protection was partly offset by various
tax rebate schemes, duty drawbacks (as in the case of Korea), and the creation of export
processing zones and bonded manufacturing warehouses, the latter institutions eventually
accounting for a significant share of Taiwanese exports.  As a consequence of these policies,
actual tariff collections were well below statutory rates (Figure 5).  Beginning in 1989, the
government undertook a far-reaching trade liberalization that brought the level of trade protection
down to developed country levels, at least in the manufacturing sector.
Putting the tax, subsidy, and trade components together, Smith calculates effective rates of
assistance.  Her tables make interesting reading.  For example, in 1989, assistance was so great in
miscellaneous food products, non-alcoholic beverages, wool and worsted fabrics, certain chemical
products, cement products, industrial fertilizers, other artificial fibres, medicines, and motor vehicles
that these sectors were producing negative value-added at world prices.  As Smith observes, a
number of these sectors were characterized by the presence of state-owned firms. Whatever the
extent of IP interventions in the 1950s and 1960s, by the 1970s and especially 1980s, the
government, convinced that its IP interventions were having only a modest impact at considerable
cost was actively attempting to scale back incentives.  This attempt to rationalize IP efforts ran into41
political constraints however, and ironically, the effective rate of assistance estimates calculated by
Smith exhibit greater cross-sectoral dispersion at the end of the 1980s than at the beginning of the
decade, as politically influential sectors were able to preserve their perquisites in the context of
overall shrinking support to industry.
Beyond these standard IP tools, there was also another set of policies conducive to the
development of the manufacturing sector, namely, the establishment of a large number of institutions
that were designed to identify, transfer, diffuse, and efficiently absorb foreign industrial technologies
and then to undertake innovation. These latter policies were largely introduced in the late 1970s and
1980s, though precursors existed in the 1960s, and included the Hsinchu Science Park and the
Industrial Technology Research Institute, ITRI.
37 These efforts reflected the fact that unlike Korea
and Japan, Taiwan’s policies were more neutral with respect to firm size. Much of its industrial
development was based on firms with fewer than 100 employees. Centralized research (ITRI) could
be justified on standard grounds that social rates of return to R & D exceed private returns while the
science park could be viewed as a means of generating economies of scope in the use of critical
services such as accounting and consulting that were provided by the park.  Moreover, part of the
rationale of the science park was to demonstrate to expatriate Taiwanese, largely in the U.S., that
Taiwan was committed to a serious effort in high technology. Whether this was as important as the
high salaries in luring engineers back to Taiwan is unknown. 
The government also fostered the creation of venture capital funds to provide capital for
these start-ups.  Intellectual property rights protection, which had been notoriously lax in Taiwan,
was tightened in the 1990s, in response to internal factors (the growth of IPR-producing activities
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domestically) and external pressures for better IPR enforcement, bilaterally from the US, regionally
through APEC, and multilaterally through Taiwan’s WTO accession negotiations.
As in the case of Japan and Korea, a variety of studies have been carried out on the
effectiveness of policies in stimulating more rapid growth.  Smith (2000) presents work by herself
and others that, as in the case of Japan and Korea, generally fail to find links between these IP
interventions and sectoral TFP growth or trade performance.  Rather, the pattern of IP intervention
appears to be driven more by political economy considerations such as sectoral employment, the
presence of large firms, or the degree of sectoral concentration than dynamic comparative advantage.43
An alternative method (Pack and Lin, 2001) follows a different strategy, assuming there are
non-measured forms of stimulation such as the subsidy equivalent of the establishment of industrial
parks, centralized research institutes, and centralized productivity centers. These may be large and
have a limited correlation with the ERP or ERS. It then assumes that any exceptional growth in the
favored industrial sectors was due entirely to industrial policy and that the TFP growth rate in such
sectors was doubled. With these assumptions that are very favorable to finding a positive role
industrial policy, they find that industrial policy could have added 2 percentage points of TFP growth
in manufacturing. Given that manufacturing accounted for about 30 percent of GDP, this would have
increased aggregate TFP by roughly .6 per year out of a total GDP growth rate of 10 percent per year
in the period 1962-89, not trivial but hardly the entire story of Taiwan’s development. The high rate
of TFP growth in all sectors, even neglected ones, the high rate of saving and investment, even apart
from the higher levels induced by industrial policy, and the acquisition of skills through education
all played a significant role. Industrial policy may have played a more significant role if one accepts
the most optimistic assumptions.
The preceding assumes that the impact of selective industrial policies benefited only the
promoted sectors and that the high rate of productivity growth in the neglected sectors was not
affected by spillovers. If, however, the rate of TFP growth in neglected sectors was increased
indirectly by the growth of the favored sectors,  the calculated increment to TFP may underestimate
the impact of industrial policy. Indeed proponents of the benefit of industrial policies often argue that
some of its major effects are manifested indirectly in other sectors, and dismiss as inconsequential
evidence about the limited impact in the targeted sectors.44
Employing the input-output approach similar to that described above for Korea to obtain
some measure of the potential indirect impact of the promoted sectors, Pack and Lin (2001) find
similarly small evidence of potential gains accruing to the neglected sectors.
6. Latin American Experience
In the 1950s while Korea and Taiwan were quite poor and often exhibited incoherent
economic policies, many Latin American economies embarked on systematic import substitution
(ISI) programs reflecting the regnant view of Raul Prebisch and the U.N.’s Economic Commission
for Latin America. In some cases ISI was initiated well before ECLA was established, partly out of
disillusion with world trade prospects during the depression of the 1930s and the disruptions of
World War II. Insofar as this policy, by definition, discriminated among industrial sectors, it
constituted a systematic attempt to pursue industrial policy. As is well known, the attempt failed, at
considerable economic cost. As it is always tempting to revert to earlier policies, especially if the
world economic climate changes, it may be helpful to briefly consider why Latin America
experienced failure while in Asia, the policies appears not to have damaged the economies during
their high growth period and may even have had slight benefits as indicated above.
The answer to the question has two strands, initial conditions and the mechanism for
monitoring the progress of industries benefiting from government encouragement. As has been
emphasized in numerous studies, Korea and Taiwan exhibited higher literacy rates and arguably
better infrastructure such as roads and ports at the beginning of their high growth episode. Even a
brilliantly designed economic program would have floundered if exports, an important component
of the success of Korea and Taiwan, could not have been moved to ports and if the ports had45
themselves not been fairly efficient. On the other hand, too much can be made of such differences
and of the purported benefits of the long Japanese occupation that had been responsible for education
and infrastructure, if only for their own benefit. Neither country had the university education levels
nor the health care system of an Argentina or Chile (Table 1). And both of the latter had sufficiently
good transportation and ports to have engaged in significant primary product exports.
Some authors have argued that Latin America had the luxury of attempting sustained ISI as
it could fall back on natural resource exports. Moreover, its endowments would militate in favor of
natural resource based exports and against labor-intensive exports.  Scatterplots of data on labor,
physical capital, human capital, and arable land endowments for a number of countries in 1968 are
shown in Figures 6A-D.  In each panel of figure 6 shows a barycentric projection of three
endowments.  Every endowment point on a ray emanating from one corner of the triangle has the
same ratio of the other two factors; points lying closer to the corner of the triangle have a larger
relative endowment of that factor.  The point in which the three rays emanating from each vertex
intersect in the middle of the triangle indicates the average endowment bundle of the sample.
So, for example, in figure 6A, Taiwan (TAI), Korea (KOR), Hong Kong (HK), and
Singapore  (SNG) are arrayed across the bottom of the triangle far from the land endowment vertex,
in order of increasing physical capital-labor ratios.  The point is that the land scarce countries of East
Asia tend to cluster in each scatterplot, across the bottom (indicating land scarceness) in figure 6A,
near the human capital vertex in Figure 6B, and so on.  In contrast, the Latin American countries tend
to reveal relatively large endowments of land and low endowments of physical capital with
Argentina (ARG) being a clear outlier in Figure 6A.  In Figure 6B, the large Latin American46
countries cluster near the arable land vertex with similarly situated countries such as Tunisia (TUN),
Turkey (TUR), Spain (SPA), Thailand (THA), and to a certain extent Pakistan (PAK) in the
subsequent panels.  Chile (CHI), with its lower arable land abundance, differs somewhat from
Argentina, Brazil (BRA), and Mexico (MEX) in this respect.
These multifactor starting points are important, as Leamer (1987) shows there is some
econometric evidence that land-scarce countries (such as those of East Asia) will tend to specialize
in manufactures earlier (i.e. at lower levels of per capita income) and more intensively (i.e. exhibit
higher output per worker ratios) than economies with more diversified resource bases.  Moreover,
while economies along the bottom of figure 6A will almost surely experience rising wages as
physical capital is accumulated and capital-labor ratios rise, generating “growth with equity.”  In
contrast, in economies with larger natural resource bases, the rents generated by resource extraction
will retard specialization in manufacturing, and increase the likelihood that the theoretical possibility
that capital accumulation might not be accompanied by rising wages (“growth without
development”) might obtain.    
While a full evaluation of this perspective would require examining the entire trade bundle,
some insights can be obtained by looking at the composition of manufacturing. This issue has been
investigated by the Inter-American Development Bank and the results do not quite conform to simple
expectations though other tests of the hypothesis can be constructed. Table 13 shows the revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) in 1988-90 in manufacturing for Latin America (LA), the OECD
countries, and “industrializing Asia. (IA).”  Latin America’s RCA in all manufacturing was slightly
less, 1.62, then IA. While IA did exhibit a greater RCA in unskilled labor intensive than LA, 3.3847
vs. 2.51, it also had a greater RCA in natural resource intensive products, 1.91 vs. 1.15. Thus, IA was
able to import, process, and export resource based manufactured products. The latter is a surprising
result given the costs of importing raw materials. It implies that even in resource based sectors, the
efficiency of LA manufacturing was low. This implies that ISI probably had the effect of
discouraging those sectors in which LA had a comparative advantage because of transportation costs
with the reverse holding true in Asia. This is simply another instance of the perverse effects of the
LA’s efforts at selective promotion via ISI.
An interesting parallel to Latin America is the experience of the Philippines. It began the
post-war period with many advantages including high education (Tables 1 and 6), a large number
of English speakers  (conducive to trade relations), and close affiliation with the U.S. Nevertheless,
despite predictions in the 1950s that it would be the success story in Asia (Morawetz, 1980), its
dismal performance reflected import substitution policies similar to those of Latin America. Most
of the standard empirical studies of the impact of ISI, one version of industrial policy, bracket the
Philippines with Latin American countries (see, for example, Little, Scitovsky, Scott, 1970). The
correct latitude and longitude placing a country in Asia was hardly a guarantor of growth – correct
basic policies matter.38
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Hence to point solely to initial conditions is inadequate – the differences in the nature of the
industrial policies and their implementation is critical. Extensive protection was given to many
sectors in Latin America as evidenced by the high rates of effective protection calculated for all of
the countries for which such estimates were made.  While the general characteristic was that
protection rates were highest for consumer goods and lowest for machinery, they were nevertheless
high for most sectors. Firms in inefficient sectors could earn significant profits and their employees
high wages (paid out of the rents collected from consumers) and faced little credible prospect that
protection would be contingent on improved efficiency. There was simply no monitoring mechanism
– once protection was granted, there was little reduction in its level until crises occurred in the 1980s
and later.
In contrast, in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan there was continuous monitoring of the progress of
firms. The clearest example is provided by Korea in which subsidized credit and protection in the
domestic market were contingent on export performance. Exports became the numeraire by which
the progress of individual firms was measured. Current data on exports of individual firms were
presented at quarterly meetings at the Blue House, the seat of the executive, with all of the firms in
a given promoted sector. The information was obtained not from companies but from bills of lading
at Korean ports. Realized exports were compared with targets set by the Economic Planning Board
for each firm. As the export targets were constantly increased, firms were forced to improve their
productivity in order to lower marginal costs, the alternative being lower profits over time. While
many firms initially subsidized their unprofitable exports by cross-subsidies from their profitable
(protected) domestic market, clearly this could not be a long-term solution as the export targets were49
increased considerably faster than the growth of domestic sales. Firms were thus forced to
concentrate on improving productivity, hence the enormous efforts to import and assimilate foreign
technology. (Dahlman and Westphal, 1985 and Kim, 1999 on Korea; Dahlman and Sananikone,
1997, and Pack, 2001 on Taiwan). Despite controversies about the precise levels of TFP growth in
Korea and Taiwan, it is clear that their rates were far above those in Latin America during its import
substitution phase. (Bosworth and Collins, 1996; Nelson and Pack, 1999). In contrast, in Latin
America there was no attempt to combine a stick of control with the carrot of protection. There are
no instances in the literature with which we are familiar, of a government’s actually reducing
protection to sectors that did not perform well.
As noted above it is impossible to confirm substantial benefits from industrial policies in
Asia. But as contrasted with the Latin American experience in ISI, no major short-term damage was
done. Korea and Taiwan did experience fairly high TFP growth rates compared to Latin America
though much of this according to all calculations would have accrued without selective intervention.
The major difference we believe is the use of some numeraire, particularly exports, to measure
success rather than the provision of open ended protection for inefficient sectors. Nevertheless, even
the benign experience in Korea and Taiwan during the heady days of intervention and growth may
have had unfortunate long term consequences.   Again emphasizing Korea’s experience, many
problems that have been experienced in recent years may have their origin in the policies pursued.
The suppression of the financial system and the use of directed credit to individual firms discouraged
the accumulation of normal financial evaluation skills and may have affected the quality of financial
intermediation in Korea. Low cost loans clearly encouraged many firms to expand beyond their core50
competence – capable manufacturing firms entered the resort industry.
While a full scholarly understanding will take some time to emerge, it may be the case that
any benefits of industrial policy were eventually partly offset by the unforeseen consequences set in
motion. Having pursued the earlier policies with care about implementation, Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan did not suffer and may have extracted some small benefit for several decades though some
would argue they could have done still better given their high saving and investment rates. Latin
American nations on the other hand suffered almost immediately from protection combined with
overvalued exchange rates that discouraged exporting. Thus the Asian countries were able to zoom
past their initial Latin per capita income peers (or superiors) such as Argentina and Chile. But to
benefit from ISI would have required a much different economic outlook, including a focus on some
measure of efficiency, exports or other, and a political system capable of enforcing the need to
improve productivity in order to receive the rents extracted from households as consumers and
taxpayers.
Perhaps one advantage of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan lay in the traumatic experiences
following World War II. For reasons that differed in each case, the governments had little legitimacy.
Japan had suffered a traumatic defeat after initiating the Second World War in the Pacific. Korea had
gained independence from its Japanese colonial ruler but had then been partitioned and a devastating
three-year war destroyed much of the infrastructure and caused enormous casualties during 1950-52.
Taiwan was the base of the defeated Kuomintang government that had hastily left the mainland in
1949. In each case, the government eventually tried to establish its legitimacy by emphasizing
economic growth in the 1950s in Japan and early 1960s in Korea and Taiwan. In all three a land51
reform had overcome one set of opponents to policies that were conducive to growth with equity;
in turn this sharing in rapid growth may have led to a perception that government policies benefited
the general population.39  Thus, the IP followed in these countries which required a quid pro quo
and in which exports were accepted as the numeraire may have been easier to follow and permitted
the avoidance of protection without time limits and without the forced benefits of learning to
compete internationally.
7. Conclusions
We believe that the weight of the evidence marshaled in this paper suggests that at most
industrial policy made a minor contribution to the growth of East Asia. A large part of the “Asian
Miracle” was attributable to non-miraculous good macro-economic policy including limited
government deficits, low rates of inflation, and very stable real exchange rates. These were
conducive to high rates of saving and investment, important components of the growth story.
Another aspect, not discussed earlier, was a bias towards exporting that may have generated some
benefits that would not have accrued from domestic sales. (Pack, 1997)
Secondly, the Asian path is more likely to generate “growth with equity” as capital is
accumulated, and less likely to run into problems with allocating natural resource derived rents. The
politics of IP are likely to be less contentious, and as they are implemented in the manufacturing
sector they are more likely to be “leaning with the wind” of comparative advantage. In any event,
the strategy may be irreproducible:  some of the subsidies carried out by the East Asians in the past
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can no longer been pursued.  The end of the Cold War and the concomitant willingness of the US
and other major trading powers to assert their economic interests, together with the existence of a
stronger subsidies code and dispute settlement in the WTO may foreclose options that existed in the
past.
Countries that have experienced slower growth than expected despite relatively good
macroeconomic policies may be tempted to pursue industrial policies. The large number of
experiments with ISI suggest this has not been very successful. The Asian experience, especially in
Korea and Taiwan provide some guidelines to avoiding some of the potential harmful consequences
if industrial policy is nevertheless pursued. Yet even in these successful nations the evidence
suggests that the benefits were limited. Countries with less dedicated and competent bureaucracies
and more amenable to lobbying pressures could expect even smaller net benefits.
While it is understandable that countries that have gotten the basics correct are impatient that
growth has not accelerated, identifying broad sectors of growth, let alone specific ones, is particularly
difficult. In the past fifteen years, food and wine exports from Chile have grown dramatically (Figure
7). It is unlikely that government officials considering promotion measures would have had
agriculture, no less peaches, grapes, apricots, and plums grown in the November through March, on
the list of potentially profitable export sectors. While governments can provide the broad
infrastructure such as education in agronomy, efficient airports and telecommunications, the detailed
knowledge of the potential of such sectors is typically beyond the competence of officials.
The difficulty of demonstrating that the major source of either manufacturing or aggregate
economic growth was sectorally targeted industrial policies is not equivalent to denying the53
importance of a significant government role other than macroeconomic management in stimulating
economic growth. Growth enhancing measures that did not differentiate among sectors included
large expenditures on primary and secondary education, the building of large and efficient social
infrastructure, a favorable attitude towards international technology transfer including both
technology licensing and direct foreign investment, and a substantial investment in public technology
institutions. The credible commitment of government to rapid development may itself have a
positive effect on risk taking in the private sector and have led firms to choose product or processes
that promised greater return.  Governments seeking a more active role in accelerating growth should
consider these policies rather than selective industrial policies.54
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Table 1
 
Human Capital and Per Capita Income, mid-1950s,
selected Asian and Latin American countries
Country Year Human Capital
Index
Per Capita Income Ratio of Human Capital
Index to Per Capita Income
Japan 1955 1673 519 3.2
Korea 1955 494 217 2.3
The Philippines 1956 738 277 2.7
Malaysia 1957 334 351 1.0
Argentina 1955 760 1059 0.7
Mexico 1955 352 637 0.6
Note:  Human capital index is educational expenditure embodied in the labor force. See      Psacharopoulos (1974).
 Values for Japan and Mexico interpolated from observations for 1950 and 1960; value for Argentina interpolated
from observations from 1947 and 1960.
Per capita income is purchasing power adjusted figure in international dollars from the Penn World Tables.  62
Table 2
Capital Subsidy-Investment Ratio – Japan
1968 1976 1984
Industry
Loan Tax Total Loan Tax Total Loan Tax Tota
l







Food processing 0.65 0.49 1.14 1.24 0.81 2.05 0.51 0.46 0.97
Textiles 0.66 1.60 2.26 2.59 0.88 3.47 0.22 0.51 0.73
Pulp and paper 0.01 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.66 0.69 0.03 0.42 0.45
Chemicals 0.71 0.54 1.25 1.63 0.39 2.02 0.44 0.17 0.61
Petroleum and coal products 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 2.83 0.14 2.97
Nonmetallic products NA NA NA 0.72 0.11 0.83 0.44 0.13 0.57
Iron and steel 0.50 0.87 1.37 1.39 0.58 1.97 1.52 0.96 2.48
Nonferrous metal 0.48 0.46 0.94 8.40 0.34 8.74 0.62 0.35 0.97
Metal products 0.85 1.16 2.01 1.52 0.75 2.27 0.57 0.63 1.20
General machinery 0.35 0.50 0.95 2.02 0.43 2.45 0.28 0.20 0.48
Electrical machinery 0.37 0.84 1.21 1.25 0.47 1.72 0.39 1.45 1.84
Transportation machinery 2.95 0.79 3.74 3.76 0.71 4.47 0.56 0.20 0.76
Precision instruments NA NA NA 0.54 0.47 1.01 0.05 NA NA
Note. Figures are in percentages
Source. Noland (1993).63
Table 3
Government Subsidy Share of Total R&D
Industry 1968 1976 1984
Mining 3.2 3.2 14.0
Food processing 0.0 0.1 0.4
Textiles 0.7 0.2 1.1
Pulp and paper 0.8 0.3 0.0
Chemicals 0.5 0.3 0.8
Petroleum and coal products 1.0 0.3 7.2
Nonmetallic products 1.0 0.8 1.8
Iron and steel 0.2 0.6 1.7
Nonferrous metal 0.8 1.5 2.9
Metal products 0.1 0.2 0.2
General machinery 1.4 2.2 1.2
Electrical machinery 1.7 1.5 1.4
Transportation machinery 1.0 4.4 4.7
Precision instruments 1.8 0.3 0.1
Source. “Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku” [“Report on the Survey of Research and Development”], various
issues.64
Table 4
Effective Rates of Protection for Japan
Industry 1968 1975 1987(Est.)
Traded Goods
24.9 19.3 15.8
     Primary 5.9 5.5 4.5
     Agriculture 7.6 9.4 7.6
     Forest -1.0 -0.1 -0.1
     Fishery 13.9 8.2 6.7
     Mining -0.6 -0.7 -0.5
Manufacturing
26.7 20.6 16.9
     Food processing 45.4 55.6 54.1
     Textile spinning 21.0 10.8 12.5
     Textile weaving 33.6 92.6 94.2
     Textile products 41.0 35.4 35.1
     Wooden products 18.7 8.9 6.6
     Pulp and paper 21.9 21.9 13.5
     Publishing -3.4 -3.3 -2.3
     Leather and rubber 26.0 23.5 22.0
     Chemicals 18.9 15.7 12.3
     Petroleum and coal products 10.9 6.7 7.0
     Nonmetallic mineral products 17.7 8.8 6.4
     Iron and steel 28.9 20.8 14.9
     Nonferrous metals 31.0 32.2 20.1
     Metal products 18.7 8.6 6.3
     General machinery 17.9 8.2 6.2
     Electrical machinery 21.0 13.4 6.5
     Transport machinery 45.4 5.4 1.4
     Precision machinery 27.3 8.7 7.2
     Miscellaneous products 28.0 20.4 9.9
Source. Shouda (1982).65
Table 5
Normalized Sectoral Tax Rates













Electrical Mach. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.56 10
General Mach. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.56 10
Trans. Equip. -0.403 8 -0.13 7 -0.56 10
Fabricated Metal -0.069 7 -0.26 8 -0.35 8
Pet & Coal -0.009 3 0.30 3 0.14 3
Precision Inst. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.35 7
Cer/Stone/Glass -0.009 3 0.30 3 -0.56 10
Pulp & Paper -0.891 13 -0.13 6 0.00 5
Chemicals -0.009 3 -1.72 13 0.04 4
Basic Metals -0.069 6 0.30 3 -0.35 8
Processed Foods -0.736 12 -1.52 12 0.00 5
Mining 6.658 1 0.92 2 1.04 1
Textiles 0.719 2 11.68 1 0.50 2
Source: Beason and Weinstein (1996), Table 1.Table 6






Japan 1955 589903 0.152
Korea 1956 80935 0.206
The Philippines 1957 224988 0.145
Malaysia 1967 8455 0.142
Argentina 1955 142522 0.161
Mexico 1961 94073 0.255
Chile 1957 18185 0.214
Source: UNESCO67
Table 7
Intersectoral Purchases - Korea, 1985
Purchases from:
---------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) (4)









food .147 .007 .021 .029
beverages .290 .025 .012 .019
tobacco .048 .002 .006 .009
textiles & cloth. .522 .007 .125 .099
leather .319 .003 .055 .355
wood & wood products .240 .026 .043 .060
paper .422 .019 .044 .183
printing & publ. .408 .017 .042 .039
petroleum & coal .053 .003 .003 .009
rubber products .373 .025 .121 .124
non-metallic min. .293 .029 .020 .029
misc. mfg. .402 .096 .087 .123
average 0.293 0.021 0.047 0.134
Favored Sectors:
chemicals .357 .010 .249 .209
heavy industries
iron & steel .542 .466 .009 .131
metal products .412 .335 .031 .143
non-elec. mach. .387 .334 .016 .163
elec. machinery .324 .245 .034 .272
transport equipment .388 .332 .015 .173
heavy industry
average
0.411 0.342 0.021 0.176
Source: Calculated from input-output tables contained in Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin , various
issues.68
Table 8
Purchases of Domestically Produced
and Imported Machinery
Sector Ratio of Imports to Domestic Production
Korea – 1985 Japan - 1980
General Machinery 3.04 .06
Electrical Machinery .27 .04
Source: See Tables 7 and 8.69
Table 9
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) in Manufacturers Ranked by Factor Intensity
Latin
America































1.49 0.44 1.04 0.01 1.18 -0.05 1.19 0.00
Iron and steel 3.42 2.26 0.99 -0.01 0.70 0.15 1.57 0.43
Chemical elements and
compounds
1.98 -0.05 1.03 0.02 0.32 0.12 0.73 0.32
Explosives, pyrotechnic
products
1.61 -1.36 0.90 0.11 0.19 -0.12 1.11 -0.83
Rubber manufactures 1.16 0.22 1.03 0.03 0.87 -0.25 0.84 0.08
Plastic materials 1.12 0.72 1.06 -0.03 0.57 0.35 0.66 0.25
Manufacturers of metal,
n.e.s.
1.05 0.10 1.01 0.01 0.80 -0.12 1.00 0.37
Chemical materials and
products, n.e.s.
0.99 -0.50 1.06 0.02 0.40 0.22 0.69 0.16
Dyeing, tanning and
coloring materials
0.91 -0.21 1.06 0.03 0.33 0.09 0.89 -0.29
Plumbing, heating, and
lighting equipment
0.84 -0.03 1.04 0.03 0.63 -0.46 1.14 0.37
Essential oils, perfume
materials, etc.
0.84 -1.34 1.05 0.04 0.42 -0.02 0.35 -0.48
Transport equipment 0.83 0.13 1.08 0.03 0.29 -0.00 0.79 -0.16
Nonelectrical
machinery




0.60 -0.67 1.05 0.05 0.17 -0.21 1.66 -0.12
Misc. manufactured
goods
0.46 -0.41 0.97 0.00 1.53 -0.53 0.47 -0.03
Electrical machinery
and appliances
0.43 -0.09 0.97 -0.02 1.89 0.12 0.66 -0.24
Prof., sci., and control
instruments
0.37 0.05 1.03 0.01 0.88 -0.56 0.53 -0.09
Unskilled labor-
intensive
2.51 -0.58 0.80 -0.03 3.38 -1.54 1.41 -0.32
Leather and leather
manufacturers
5.50 -1.91 0.88 0.08 1.02 0.65 0.54 0.3070
Footwear 3.74 0.48 0.71 -0.08 3.40 0.68 2.61 -0.71
Textile yarn and fabrics 1.14 -0.60 0.85 -0.05 1.78 -0.21 0.97 0.16
Travel goods and
handbags
1.10 -1.64 0.72 0.05 4.54 -2.91 2.02 0.38
Clothing 0.85 -0.69 0.63 -0.03 4.23 -2.28 1.07 -0.46
Furniture 0.36 -0.14 1.04 0.03 0.68 0.01 1.48 0.06
Natural resource-
intensive
1.15 -0.09 1.00 0.04 1.91 -0.34 0.95 0.40
Wood and cork
products
1.48 -0.79 0.81 -0.01 3.38 -0.45 1.40 0.81
Manufactured fertilizers 1.22 0.37 0.95 0.01 0.68 -0.55 1.04 0.46
Nonmetallic mineral
manufacturers
1.11 0.12 0.97 0.05 0.52 -0.01 0.95 0.36
Paper manufacturers 1.07 0.14 1.08 0.01 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.04
Mineral tar and crude
chemicals
0.71 -0.50 0.86 0.34 2.64 -0.56 0.00 -0.94
Note: The totals for the three factor-intensity categories are trade-weighted averages of the individual product divisions,
and the total for manufacturers is calculated as the trade-weighted average of the three factor intensity categories.  The
ordering of product divisions within the three categories is based upon the ranking of the product divisions in the Latin
American region during 1988-90.  a = Based on regional RCA index values at the 2-digit SITC code level for 1988-90
and changes from 1978-80.
b =  Industrializing Asia includes Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines.
c = The ex-CPEs (centrally planned economies) consist of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, due to lack of available
data for the remaining countries in this category.
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Source:  Smith (1997, Table 4; 2000, Table 


































































Source: Smith 1997 Table 2, 2000 Table 2.2 Figure 6A
Endowment Triangle 
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